ISO 27001
Moving an ISMS from ISO 27001:2013 to the 2022 revision
The 2022 revision restructured Annex A into four themes, consolidated overlapping controls and introduced new ones. Here is what that means in practice for an existing ISMS.
Published · 8 min read · ISO 27001
In short
- The management system clauses changed little. Annex A was restructured substantially.
- The mapping is not one-to-one, so the Statement of Applicability cannot simply be renumbered — this is where most of the effort goes.
- Genuinely new obligations cluster around threat intelligence, cloud services, secure configuration and monitoring.
- Your implementation consultant cannot provide the internal audit the standard requires over their own work.
What actually changed
The management system clauses — 4 through 10 — changed relatively little in substance. The significant restructuring is in Annex A, which was reorganised from the previous domain structure into four control themes: organisational, people, physical and technological.
That reorganisation is not merely cosmetic. Overlapping controls were consolidated, some were reworded to change what they require, and a set of genuinely new controls was introduced covering areas the 2013 version predated — including threat intelligence, information security for cloud services, and requirements around secure development and configuration.
The Statement of Applicability is the real work
Your existing Statement of Applicability is keyed to the old control numbering. It cannot simply be renumbered, because the mapping is not one-to-one: some old controls merged, some split, and the new ones have no predecessor to inherit a justification from.
Every control in the new Annex A needs a fresh determination of applicability with a justification that stands on its own. In practice this is where most of the transition effort goes, and it is worth doing properly — the SoA is the first document a certification auditor reads.
The 2022 structure
Where organisations find genuine gaps
- Threat intelligence — most organisations consume threat feeds informally, if at all, and have no defined process for acting on them.
- Cloud services — often governed by procurement rather than by information security, with no security requirements defined at selection and no ongoing assurance.
- Secure configuration — baselines that exist for servers but not for cloud services, containers or network devices.
- Data leakage prevention — frequently interpreted as a product purchase rather than as a set of controls proportionate to actual data flows.
- Monitoring activities — logging is usually present; the requirement to actually monitor, with defined coverage and response, often is not.
Planning the transition
A structured transition has four stages. Map your existing control set onto the new structure. Identify controls that are genuinely new or materially changed. Assess your position against those specifically, rather than reassessing everything. Then rewrite the Statement of Applicability and update the risk treatment plan to match.
Organisations that treat transition as a full reimplementation spend considerably more than they need to. Organisations that treat it as a renumbering exercise fail the certification audit. The work sits between the two.
Independence in transition work
If a consultant is implementing your transition, they cannot also provide the internal audit that ISO 27001 requires over it. The standard requires internal audit to be objective and impartial, and a firm auditing its own implementation is neither. Separate the two — it is a requirement, not a preference.
Related pages
Planning an ISO 27001:2022 transition?
We assess against the new clause and control structure, rewrite the Statement of Applicability, and provide the independent internal audit the standard requires.
Request a proposal